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STATEMENT
1

CASE

The City ofldaho Falls is a municipality organized under Idaho Law, located

Bonneville County. The Idaho Falls Police Department is a division of the City ofldaho Falls.
Defendant Spencer Steele is a police office with the City ofldaho Falls and was on duty and
working on the date of the arrest of Appellant.
2.

Appellant Jesse S. Barber has filed this action naming the "City of Idaho Falls"

and the "Idaho Falls Police Department" as Defendants. The Idaho Falls Police Department is
not a separate entity from the City ofldaho Falls. (R. 106: Cook Aff., ,r 4). For purposes of this
brief, the City ofldaho Falls and the Idaho Falls Police Department will be referred to jointly as
the "City ofldaho Falls." Barber also sued Spencer Steele, a police officer employed with the
City of Idaho Falls.
3.

On January 29, 2011, Appellant was observed by Officer Steele through the

window of a home where drugs were known to be used in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (R. 103-105:
Barber Depo., 97:6-9; R. 91: Steele Aff., ,r 4).
4.

Officer Steele believed that this amounted to a reasonable suspicion that crime

was afoot, and he approached the home and knocked on the door. Appellant answered the door,
and as soon as the door opened Officer Steele immediately noticed the overwhelming smell
marijuana coming from inside the home. (R. 91: Steele Aff., ,i 5).

5.

,r

Appellant's
'-/.L.L''"'' Steele believed that marijuana was being

91:

were
in the

based upon

smell and Officer Steele's observation of Appellant's appearance. (Id.).
6.

Officer Steele asked ifhe could enter the home, and Appellant let him in. (R. 91:

Steele Af£, ,r 7). Once inside the home Appellant made his way to the kitchen, poured a large
glass of milk, and drank it. (R. 103-105: Barber Depo., 99:15-25; 101:1-25).
7.

Officer Steele testified that he believed that Appellant drank the milk to wash the

green residue out of his mouth from marijuana use. (R. 91: Steele Aff., ,r 8).
8.

The residence was owned by Sheri Bible, Appellant's mother. Officer Steele

asked Ms. Bible for permission to search the residence and she denied permission.
9.

Due to the suspicion of marijuana use, Officer Steele arrested Plaintiff for

"Frequenting Place Used, Etc." in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(D).
10.

Officer Steele has testified he did not hold any personal malice toward Appellant,

and did not act intentionally or with criminal intent in arresting Appellant (R. 91: Steele Aff., ,r
10).
11.

Captain Darren Cook was Officer Steele's supervisor at the City of Idaho Falls

Police Department. Captain Cook and the City ofldaho Falls did not have any knowledge
concerning Officer Steele that would cause them to believe Officer Steele may act unlawfully
toward Appellant. Captain Cook and the City of Idaho Falls were not aware of any disciplinary
proceedings against Officer Steele for false arrest or other policy violations in regard to Officer
2

Steele's understanding of the requirements to make an arrest Captain Cook and the City of
Idaho Falls had no knowledge that Officer Steele might engage in conduct that might be
construed to amount to a wrongful arrest. (R. 106: Cook Aff., ,i 5).
12.

Officer Steele had received POST training and department training on the proper

procedure for arrests. (R. I 06: Cook Aff., ,i 6).
IV.
ARGUMENT
Appellant's Complaint is a prose prisoner Complaint that alleges various facts and
claims arising out of what Appellant describes as an "unlawful arrest ... without a warrant or
any other legal process ... and without probable cause." See R. 63-63: Amended Complaint ,I 4.
In paragraphs 5-8 of the Amended Complaint, Appellant references the Idaho Tort Claims Act
and alleges that the conduct of Officer Steele was done "maliciously, wantonly, and
intentionally." See R. 63-63: Amended Complaint ,r 8. Appellant also appears to allege, in
paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, that the City ofidaho Falls was negligent in failing to
supervise Officer Steele. Appellant never mentions the United States Constitution, § 1983 or
any other federally protected right. No argument is advanced in this Appeal that a federally
protected right was alleged and improperly dismissed. As such, based upon the wording of the
Complaint and the district court's conclusions, the only issues on appeal arise under the Idaho
Tort Claims Act

3

On appeal, Appellant raises three issues in his opening Brief on Appeal: (l) whether
there was a genuine issue of fact to support Appellant's claim of false arrest and false
imprisonment; (2) that the exceptions of the Idaho Tort Claims act do not apply to negligence
claims; and (3) that certain documents were withheld from the Appellate record. As will be
addressed more fully below, each of these issues is without merit. An examination of the
Complaint and the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, dated July 17, 2014 (R.
173-181) reveal that Barber's allegations were unsupported by sufficient evidence to withstand
summary judgment. This Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment and
the matter should be dismissed with prejudice.

A.

Appellant Misstates The Relevant Standard of Proof On His Claims.
Appellant suggests that he has created a genuine issue of fact sufficient to withstand a

motion for summary judgment. In reviewing the record, it is clear that Appellant does not
understand the required proof to withstand a motion for summary judgment. There were two
primary causes of action advanced by Appellant: "unlawful arrest" (R. 63: Complaint, ,r 4) and
"vicarious liability" (R. 64: Complaint, ,r 9). The claims sound in tort under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act and do not contain allegations under§ 1983. (See R. 176 ("to the extent Plaintiff
refers to claims under 42 USC § 1983 in his response to Defendant's motion, any such claim is
outside the scope of Plaintiffs pleadings and will not be considered.")). With the claims
appropriately framed under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, the statutory burden of proof for such
claims is elevated above a simple negligence theory of recovery.
4

case,

case,

states

A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for
any claim which:

3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights ....
Idaho Code§ 6-904(3). Where the underlying claim arises out of an alleged false imprisonment
or false arrest, more than simply claiming the arrest or imprisonment was improper is required.
Rather, in order for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must
introduce evidence that the acts of Defendant Steele were carried out with "malice or criminal
intent." Id. Importantly, there is a rebuttable presumption that all employees acted without
malice or criminal intent. LC.§ 6-903(e).
While not statutorily defined, malice is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "l. The
intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. 2. Reckless disregard of the
law or of a person's legal rights. 3. Ill will; wickedness of heart." MALICE, Black's Law

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). This Court has further reiterated the definition of
malice in the context of the Idaho Tort Claims Act in Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho
176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986), where this court stated that legal malice "involves the intentional
commission of a wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not
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the injury was intended." See also James v. City ofBoise, 158 Idaho 713,351 P.3d 1171, 1188
(2015), reh'g denied (June 19, 2015), reh'g denied (July 20, 2015). Criminal intent is likewise
not statutorily defined but this Court also discussed the criminal intent term under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act:
The Tort Claims Act does not define the term "criminal intent," and that
phrase is not a term of art. It has various meanings, including the intent to
do wrong; the mens rea for a particular crime, which may include criminal
negligence; and the intent to violate the law, which implies knowledge of
the law violated. Black's Law Dictionary 3 80-81 (7th ed.1999).

Id. at 713,351 P.3d at 1187. This Court specifically clarified any ambiguity of the definition
when it held as follows: "We hold that 'criminal intent' as used in the Idaho Tort Claims Act
means the intentional commission of what the person knows to be a crime." Id. at 713,351 P.3d
at 1188.
In the context of Appellant's claims, the issue is not whether Respondent Steele "had a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest or detain Barber," rather it is "whether Steele
acted with malice or criminal intent." (R. 179). A review of Appellant's Brief confirms an
absence of any evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact of malice or criminal intent
Appellant has erroneously focused on creating a genuine issue of fact as to probable cause,
which is irrelevant under an application of Idaho Code § 6-904. The district court applied the
correct standard, recognizing Appellant's need to introduce some credible evidence into the
record to demonstrate Steele had acted with malice or criminal intent. No evidence was produced
and summary judgment was correctly granted. (R. 179 ("Accepting Barber's factual statements
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as true, Barber still fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to malice or criminal
intent.")).
B.

The City of Idaho Falls is Absolutely Imnnme For The Actions Of Officer Steel.
Under Idaho law and the Idaho Tort Claims Act, the City may be subject to liability for

money damages arising out of its negligent conduct and may be vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of its employees in certain circumstances. LC. 6-903. Under the express immunity
of§ 6-904(3), the City ofldaho Falls is immune from claims arising from false arrest White v.

Univ. ofIdaho, 118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108, 108-09 (1990). Idaho recognizes that an municipal
employer would not be liable for the acts of an employee that were performed with malice or
criminal intent:

In Sprague, the Supreme Court recognized that LC.§ 6-903(a) (the Idaho
Tort Claims Act) provides for liability for governmental entities for the
"negligent" or "wrongful" acts by the entity or its employees in those
cases where a private person would also be liable. However, the Court
pointed out that I.C. § 6-903(c) negates entity liability if the employees act
with malice or criminal intent. Such liability attaches to the individual
employee alone.
Herrerra v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1021, 729 P.2d 1075, 1084 (Ct. App. 1986). This Court
again confirmed the Sprague and Herrera conclusions, holding:
[t]he requirement that an employee have acted "within the course and scope of
their employment" plainly applies to the act of the employee and not of the
governmental entity. Therefore, the language "and without malice or criminal
intent" that follows the statute's requirement that the employee have acted within
the course and scope of employment, also by its plain language only applies to the
employee. Thus, "[a] governmental entity ... shall not be liable for any claim
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§

257 P.3d 1226, 1228-29 (2011).

Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400,

Hoffer, the

Court was addressing a claim arising from libel, slander or interference with contractual rights,
however, the same qualifying language regarding "within the course and scope" and "malice or
criminal intent" is used in the opening paragraph of Idaho Code § 6-904(3). Thus, an allegation
( or even the existence) of malice or criminal intent on behalf of an employee is immaterial when
considering whether a governmental entity may be sued under state common law tort theories. It
follows that a governmental entity is immune from suit based upon the immunities afforded in §
6-904(3), i.e., an alleged false arrest or incarceration. In this case, dismissal of the City for any
acts arising out of false imprisonment or incarceration was appropriate by the lower court and
this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment.

C.

There is No Evidence in the Record That the City Was Negligent in Its Hiring,
Training, or Supervision of Steele.
Aside from a general negligence claim against the City, which is without merit, the

Appellant also claimed the City was negligent it is hiring, training, or supervision of Officer
Steele. "A negligent supervision claim is not based upon imputed or vicarious liability but upon
the employer's own negligence in failing to exercise due care to protect third parties from the
foreseeable tortious acts of an employee." Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 80,
86, 14 P.3d 1074, 1080 (Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added). "An employer's duty of care requires
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that an employer who knows of an employee's dangerous propensities control the employee so
he or she will not injure third parties." Id. ( citing Podolan, 123 Idaho at 946, 854 P.2d at 289).
This claim lacked any supporting evidence and was appropriately dismissed. Absent from
the record is any evidence of neglect by the City ofldaho Falls in Steele's training,
certifications, supervision, etc. Conversely, the Affidavit of Darren Cook confirmed that the City
of Idaho Falls and Officer Steel's supervisors were "not aware of any disciplinary proceedings
against Officer Steele for false arrest or other policy violations that would cause us to believe
that Officer Steele would commit a wrongful arrest." (R 107: Cook Aff., 15). Likewise,
"Officer Steele had received POST training and department training on the proper procedure for
arrests, including the requirements to detain a person upon reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity and/or to arrest a person based upon probable cause." (R. 107: Cook Aff., 16).
There is no evidence of prior contact between Officer Steele and Appellant that should
have caused the City ofldaho Falls to believe that ill will existed between the two. Likewise,
there was no evidence of recent incidents involving Appellant that would suggest he might be a
"foreseeable" target of wrongful arrest. Ultimately, Appellant failed to establish that the City of
Idaho Falls had knowledge of "foreseeable" tortious conduct by its officers that might pose a risk
to Appellant. There are no facts in the record that it was foreseeable to the City of Idaho Falls
that Officer Steele would wrongfully arrest Appellant. There had not been any prior contact
between Officer Steele and Plaintiff that might cause the City of Idaho Falls to believe that illwill existed between the two. There had not been any recent incidents involving Plaintiff that
9

would suggest he might be a "foreseeable" target of wrongful arrest Captain Cook was not
aware of any fact that would lead him to believe that Officer Steele might engage in a wrongful
arrest. Officer Steele had received POST training and department training on the proper
procedure for arrests. The record is devoid of any evidence to contradict these statements and
create a genuine issue of fact to withstand summary judgment.

D.

Officer Steele is immune under Idaho Code § 6-904(3).
Officer Steele is immune from claims arising out of a wrongful arrest, absent a showing

that he acted with "malice" or "criminal intent." See, Idaho Code § 6-904(3). There are no
allegations in Appellant's brief to suggest that Steele acted with malice or criminal intent. As
discussed above, it is incumbent on Appellant to provide the Court with evidence that Steele
intentionally committed a wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse (i.e.,
malice) or intentionally committed a crime against Appellant (i.e., criminal intent). It is a
rebuttable presumption that Steele did not act with malice or criminal intent. LC. § 6-903(e).
Absent very specific evidence of this type of activity, summary judgment was appropriate. A
review of the record reveals a single conclusory statement of Appellant's claim of malice or
criminal intent:
He replied by claiming that my mother refused a search, wich [sic] she
never did, that I had smoked a ciggarette [sic] in his partner's cruizer [sic]
before, and that he knew I was a drug dealer and had used drugs before.
None of these reasons are grounded in fact or any legal finding of note or
record and furthermore served to expose the malicious intent behind
officer [sic] Steele's actions on behalf of his own persona] grudges."
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(R. 168-169). Conversely, a review of the record confirms that Office Steele did not act with

malice or criminal intent when he arrested Appellant. The evidence in the record is that Steele

had no malice and did not act with intentional or criminal intent (See, e.g., R. 92: Steele Aff., ,r
10; R. 107: Cook Aff., ,r 5). When Officer Steel arrived at Appellant's door, he stated that he had
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he talked with Appellant at the door, smelled
marijuana, observed Appellant's bloodshot eyes and glassy look. (R. 92: Steele Aff.,

,r,r 5-6).

Steele further confirmed that he observed Appellant pour and drink a large glass of milk in his
presence, which he believed was done to wash the green residue out of his mouth left over from
marijuana use. (R. 92: Steele Aff.,

,r,r 7-8).

Nothing in these statements can be tortured to find

malice or criminal intent. Because there was no malice or criminal intent by Steele in the record,
dismissal of all claims against Steele was appropriate. This Court should uphold the district
court's grant of summary judgment.
E.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act Covers All Acts of Negligence.

Appellant makes the illogical assertion that the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not cover
general negligence claims. As noted above, the Idaho Tort Claims act provides that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for money
damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its
employees acting with the course and scope of their employment or duties ... " LC. § 6-903(a).
Of course, anytime a plaintiff claims negligence by a governmental entity, the Idaho Tort Claims
Act is implicated. In considering a motion for summary judgment for a governmental entity
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a

Tort

determine:
... whether tort recovery is allowed under the laws of Idaho; and, if so,
whether an exception to liability found in the tort claims act shields the
alleged misconduct from liability; and, if no exception applies, whether
the merits of the claim as presented for consideration on the motion for
summary judgment entitle the moving party to dismissal.

Harris v. State Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298 n. 1, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 n. 1
(1992). Any argument that the exceptions under the Act do not apply is groundless. As has been
discussed fully above, the lower court clearly analyzed the relevant standards of proof and found
a dearth of evidence supporting any of the allegations in this matter. Ultimately, the underlying
claims all arise out of an alleged wrongful arrest and incarceration. But for the claimed
wrongful arrest, none of the other claims occur. As such, the enumerated exceptions under the
Idaho Tort Claims Act absolutely apply.

F.

All of the Documents Referenced By Appellant Were Part of the Record.
Appellant suggests that there were documents missing from the Record. However, a

comparison between the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Exhibits Attached to Appellant's
Brief confirm a complete Clerk's Record.

Plaintiff's Brief in Response to
Defendant's Memorandum In Support of
Motion for Summa Jud ent
Ex. 1A (excerpt Defendants' Responses to
Plaintiff's 2 nd Discove

R. 111 to 120
R. 121

R. 122
12

Responses to
R. 165-170
Ex. 2 (Affidavit And Memorandum In
Su ort of Civil Com laint
Ex. 3 (excerpt Defendants' Responses to
Plaintiffs Discove
Ex. 4 (Bates No. City ofldaho Falls
000001-000005
Ex. 5 Police Record
Ex. 6 (Jail Records Letter- dated August
12, 2013
Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion
Jud ent
for Summ
Memorandum In Support Of Motion for
Summ
Jud ent

R. 124-127
R. 128
R. 129-131

R. 132-135
R. 136

R. 141-146
R. 82-90
R. 91-94
R. 106-108
R. 95-105

Affidavit of Darren Cook
Affidavit of Blake G. Hall

As confirmed above, the Clerk's Record on Appeal is complete and includes every
document filed with the Court. As such, any claim that the record is incomplete is without merit.
The only document not included in the Clerk's Record was the complete deposition transcript
from the Deposition of Jesse S. Barber. As was previously addressed via Appellant's motion to
augment, the complete transcript was never introduced into evidence for consideration by the
lower court. Appellant failed to include the full deposition transcript in the proceedings below.
The only portion of Barber's deposition that was made part of the record was pages 97-104. No
other portions of the transcript were cited or analyzed in support of the Defendant's Motion for
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Summary Judgment. As Idaho law makes clear, the Court is "bound by the record and cannot
consider matters or materials not part of or contained therein." State ex rel. Ohman v. Ivan H.
Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825,827,820 P.2d 695,697 (1991). Because the full deposition
transcript was not available or considered by the lower court, it is likewise inadmissible here
because it was never part of the record. There is no merit to the third issue raised on appeal and it
should be ignored.

v.
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Defendants seeks an award of attorney fees in
accordance with Idaho Code §§ 6-91 SA and 12-117. Section 6-9 l 8A provides a recovery to a
municipal entity "showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party against whom or
which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance
or defense of the action." Section 12-117 provides for a municipal entity to recover attorney fees
when "the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law." Under the applicable statutes, the City is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal
inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without foundation.
Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to make a
legitimate showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Bowles v. Pro Jndiviso, Inc., 132
Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). In this case, there is no evidence that the district court
misapplied the law. The language of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is clear that a plaintiff must
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rebut the presumption that a officer acted with malice or criminal intent. No such showing was
made. Rather, Appellant misapplies the standard of proof and relies on unsubstantiated
conjecture in continuing to prosecute this matter. The district court's holdings were consistent
with well-established Idaho law and Appellant has failed to present a legitimate argument that
would justify the instant appeal. This Court should grant Defendants' request for attorneys' fees
and costs on appeal.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the district court correctly analyzed the Idaho Tort Claims Act
and the evidence in the record. The district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate,
recognizing there was no evidence in the record to support any malice or criminal intent by
Office Steele. This Court should affirm the district court's ruling on appeal.
Dated this ,.,L3._ day of November, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _L]_ day of November, 2015, by the method indicated below:

l)efMailing

Jesse S. Barber

IMSI A-l-15A

[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Email
[ ] Hand-Delivery

PO Box 51
Boise, ID 83707
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